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EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AT GROUND LEVEL:  
THE CONSEQUENCES OF NONSTATE ACTION 
KENNETH L. KARST† 
INTRODUCTION 
More than four decades ago Bill Van Alstyne and I, juniors on 
the Ohio State law faculty, co-authored an article.1 We argued that 
the judge-made “state action” doctrine, understood as a formal 
barrier to claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, was impeding 
serious judicial consideration of things that mattered.2 Four years 
later, after migrating to Duke, Bill added a trenchant critique 
elaborating on the theme and deepening the analysis.3 For a time, 
academic commentary looked forward to a lowering of the state 
action barrier,4 but the Supreme Court soon put an end to such 
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economic development and in commenting on a draft of this Essay. My debt to him will be 
obvious in the concluding pages of the text. My thanks to Jennifer Lentz and Kevin Gerson, two 
of our school’s marvelous Research Librarians, for their typical (i.e., extraordinary) help. Given 
this Essay’s concerns about equal employment opportunity, I should note that for several 
months these two took turns; each provided research assistance to me and my colleagues while 
the other stayed home with Alexander, born in 2003. Perhaps this will be Alexander’s first 
footnote, but it seems unlikely to be his last. 
 1. William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961). 
 2. Id. at 3–6. As we then recognized, the pathbreaking article was Harold W. Horowitz, 
The Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 
208 (1957). All writers along these lines owe a debt of gratitude to Robert Hale’s essay, Force 
and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
149 (1935). Among a wealth of modern discussions of the state action doctrine, two standouts 
are LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 49–71 (1996) (chapter on “The State Action Paradox”), and Gillian 
E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1410–37, 1456–1502 (2003). 
 3. William W. Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of 
State Action , 1965 DUKE L.J. 219, 219–24. 
 4. E.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” 
Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14 , 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 108 (1967) (noting that 
the then-existing “‘state action’ criterion shows few signs of life”); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold 
W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey : A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. 
REV. 39, 65–66 (“It is sufficient to say that there is general agreement on at least one point: that 
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speculations. In this Essay I do not rake the ashes of this debate—at 
least not explicitly. Rather, I seek to highlight the importance of 
nongovernmental discrimination in the lives of the individuals whose 
experiences add up to group subordination, and to add some 
reminders that the line between “state action” and “private action” 
has become conspicuously artificial in today’s America. 
Factitious or not, the state action barrier remains high, leaving 
untouched even those forms of “private” behavior that devalue the 
constitutional principle of equal citizenship. I begin with some 
evidence that federal and state civil rights laws can help to fill the gap, 
particularly in assuring access to public accommodations and equal 
access to work. As we shall see, however, in some areas of 
discrimination—notably, housing discrimination—the responsive 
capacity of regulatory law is severely limited. What remains is a hope: 
Perhaps the interactions of governmental with nongovernmental 
actors—some of the very links that minimize the appeal of the state 
action doctrine—can contribute to the vindication of equa l 
citizenship. If the public goal of an inclusive society needs help from 
private sources, it is encouraging to know that some actors in the 
private sector are recognizing their own stake in the same goal. The 
Essay concludes with some ruminations on ways in which these 
sentiments have been translated into action. This project is my tribute 
to an old friend, centered on a region of civil rights concerns where, I 
hope, he and I can find a measure of agreement. 
I.  REAL PEOPLE’S LIVES: PRIVATE  
CONDUCT AND ACCESS TO EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 
I begin by looking at two arenas of public life where 
discrimination by nongovernmental actors can undermine people’s 
experience of inclusion in the community: public accommodations 
and other places of trade, and the workplace. In both of these arenas, 
civil rights laws have had considerable success in reducing private 
discrimination. 
 
the decisions of the Supreme Court in the post-war era have steadily —and properly —extended 
the reach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to control more and more the conduct 
of private individuals.”). 
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A. Access to Public Accommodations and Other Places of Trade  
The Reconstruction Congress understood the important role 
played by private dealings in the subordination of individuals and of a 
racial group. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, even construed narrowly 
as a set of limits on official state discrimination, recognized that the 
newly freed African Americans, if they were to be equal citizens, 
needed to be treated as equals in the law of contract and property.5 In 
1875, Congress went on to prohibit racial discrimination by the 
owners and managers of hotels, theaters, railroads, and the like.6 This 
was the last of the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, for 
Reconstruction itself was abandoned in the Compromise of 1877.7 
The Supreme Court gave its own validation to this compromise in the 
Civil Rights Cases,8 which held that the 1875 Act was beyond the 
constitutional powers of Congress.9 One centerpiece of the Court’s 
opinion was its invention of the state action limitation.10 On this 
theory, the Fourteenth Amendment reached only official state action, 
and so Congress had no power to enforce the amendment’s equal 
protection clause against racial discrimination by the private owners 
and managers of public accommodations.11 
Although I shall not inflate the existing oversupply of analyses of 
this decision, I note my agreement with the first Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, writing in lone dissent.12 He called the persistence of these 
forms of nongovernmental discrimination a badge of slavery in 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment,13 and a denial of equal 
 
 5. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). In 1968, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act more generously, as 
a direct prohibition on private discrimination in sales of property. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 421 (1968). 
 6. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 7. The bargain settled the electoral dispute over the 1876 presidential election. It gave the 
Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, the presidency, in exchange for a promise to end 
the military occupation of the South, and more generally to turn the subject of race relations 
over to the “redeemer” Southern legislators—that is, to the white South. See C. VANN 
WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877  AND THE END OF 
RECONSTRUCTION 7–8 (1966) (providing a summary of the traditionally recognized terms of the 
“Bargain of 1877”).  
 8. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 9. Id. at 25. 
 10. See id. at 11 (holding that “[i]t is state action of a particular character that is 
prohibited” by the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 11. Id. at 19. 
 12. Id. at 26–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 43. 
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citizenship in violation of the Fourteenth.14 For our present purposes, 
what matters is Justice Harlan’s recognition that equal access to 
public accommodations was a telling indicator of civil freedom and 
equal citizenship.15 When he said that hotels and theaters and 
railroads performed “public functions,”16 he was referring not simply 
to the licensing of those businesses by the state, but also to their long-
understood places in the public life of the community. Their functions 
as public institutions had been recognized in the ancient common law 
that required innkeepers and common carriers to be open to all 
citizens.17 To be turned away from a hotel on account of one’s race 
was a social symbol of major importance, a badge of racial inferiority 
worn in public.18 
The system of Jim Crow, given early encouragement by the 
Supreme Court,19 was not just a legal structure. It was a total social 
system, in which public and private behaviors were interlaced to 
maintain the subordination of a race. Privately-owned public 
accommodations made their own contributions, systematically 
denying access to African Americans or segregating the races, in 
either case symbolizing the all-pervading racial hierarchy.20 When 
W.E.B. DuBois protested against these indignities and their parallels 
in the North, he did not distinguish between official and private forms 
of racial discrimination.21 And when the modern civil rights 
movement began, it was no accident that the earliest forms of direct 
action were the sit-ins and the freedom rides.22 The black college 
students who sat at privately-owned lunch counters, awaiting service 
until the police led them away, and the black and white riders who sat 
together in privately-owned buses, were symbolically claiming their 
places as equal citizens, entitled to respect in their communities’ 
public life. To be told that you are not wanted at the lunch counter, or 
 
 14. Id. at 54. 
 15. See id. at 62 (“To-day it is the colored race which is denied, by corporations and 
individuals wielding public authority, rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship.”). 
 16. Id. at 36. 
 17. Id. at 40–41. 
 18. Id. at 42–43. 
 19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896). 
 20. The classic treatment is still JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN 
TOWN (1937). 
 21. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE CRISIS WRITINGS passim (Daniel Walden ed., 1972). 
 22. For the account of one young woman of these intense —and tense —times, see generally 
ANNE MOODY, COMING OF AGE IN MISSISSIPPI (1968). 
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that you have to sit in the back of the bus, is to be told—in the most 
public way imaginable—that you are not good enough to sit with 
those who are the real citizens. The degradation, the hurt, attaches 
first to the individual, but it is instantly recognized by all persons of 
all races as reflecting—and reinforcing—a group status harm. 
No wonder, then, that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 devoted one 
title to the prohibition of racial discrimination in hotels, restaurants, 
gas stations, and places of entertainment.23 Compliance with this part 
of the Act, on the whole, has been a success story. In the South, 
before 1964, a restaurant owner or hotel manager might be afraid to 
serve nonwhites, for fear of a loss of white trade or even violent 
retaliation. After the Supreme Court upheld the Act, some restaurant 
owners and virtually all large hotels quickly opened their doors to all 
comers. It is fair to say that today, in the field of traditional public 
accommodations, a culture of compliance has taken hold. The case of 
a major operator’s racial discrimination makes headlines.24 
Retail stores are not covered by the 1964 act, but most states 
have adopted civil rights acts of their own, and some such laws 
(California ’s, for example) apply generally to all business 
establishments.25 Yet, African Americans’ accounts of suspicion, 
denial of entry, and worse are so plentiful that Regina Austin could 
say—supporting her assertion with persuasive evidence—“[t]here can 
hardly be a black person in urban America who has not been denied 
entry to a store, closely watched, snubbed, questioned about her or 
his ability to pay for an item, or stopped and detained for 
shoplifting.”26 These chronicles are matched by persistent stories that 
African American males, even dressed in Wall Street attire, have 
trouble getting a taxi after the sun goes down. And Patricia Williams’s 
now-famous account of being locked out of a Benetton store in New 
 
 23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243–246 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000)). 
 24. A celebrated series of lawsuits against Denny’s restaurants was settled by a payment of 
damages totaling $46 million and forms of corporate apology that included a $1.45 million grant 
to nine civil rights organizations, announced in the presence of the heads of many of those 
organizations. See, e.g., Kia Morgan Allen, Denny’s Restaurants Give Black Groups $1.5 Million, 
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Jan. 16, 1997, at E1; Denny’s Begins Check Reimbursement to 
Settle Discrimination Claims, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 12, 1995, at C3. See 
generally JIM ADAMSON, THE DENNY’S STORY: HOW A COMPANY IN CRISIS RESURRECTED ITS 
GOOD NAME AND REPUTATION (2000). 
 25. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51–53 (West 2000). 
 26. Regina Austin, “A Nation of Thieves”: Securing Black People’s Right to Shop and to 
Sell in White America , 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 148. 
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York,27 apparently doubted by some white readers,28 finds ready 
acceptance among black readers.29 It may be hard to do scientific 
studies of such incidents,30 but at a minimum the frequency of reports 
shows the distance we have yet to travel in eradicating racialized 
fears. I say “fears” because there is a substantial likelihood that the 
same employee who bars the door against an African American also 
believes—sincerely—in racial nondiscrimination as an abstract norm. 
We are dealing here with the unconscious racism that has been 
illuminated by Charles Lawrence, Linda Hamilton Krieger, and 
others.31 
It bears repeating that many such incidents are violations of state 
civil rights laws. Yet the indignities mostly go unchallenged in court, 
unless they appear to be condoned by the management of a large 
company.32 Surely this type of civil rights statute deserves enactment 
in every state. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 deserves to be 
broadened to apply to these institutions as well as the traditional 
public accommodations—concededly a political result that is most 
unlikely today.33 Even if enforcement litigation were rare, a statutory 
ban against (for example) race-based denials of service would help to 
call the subject to the attention of retail corporations’ top managers. 
Publicity, too, is an informal enforcement mechanism, as Benetton’s 
 
 27. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW 
PROFESSOR 44–51 (1991). 
 28. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 371–73 (1995) (“[I]s she [Williams] 
embroidering the facts for dramatic effect . . . ? Also, how does she know that the sales clerk 
refused to let her in the store because she’s black?”). 
 29. I base the latter statement, not on survey research, but on conversations with African 
American colleagues. 
 30. See Peter Siegelman, Racial Discrimination in “Everyday” Commercial Transa ctions: 
What Do We Know, What Do We Need to Know, and How Can We Find Out? , in A NATIONAL 
REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING 69 (Michael Fix & 
Margery Austin Turner eds., 1999). On a related theme, see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender 
and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819 (1991) and Ian 
Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. 
ECON. REV. 304, 304–05 (1995). 
 31. See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 32. Even in such a case, a boycott is as likely as a lawsuit. For a discussion on boycotts, see 
Austin, supra  note 26, at 155. 
 33. For a masterful treatment of the historical development of this body of law, see 
generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996). Singer reported tha t only seven states, all former 
members of the Confederacy, entirely lacked such laws at the time he wrote. Id. at 1437. He 
would read the 1964 Act to cover retailers, and alternatively calls for an amendment to achieve 
that purpose, an event with a “likelihood . . . close to zero.” Id. at 1423. 
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management must know. How many glossy “united colors” ads in the 
New Yorker were neutralized when Patricia Williams blew the 
whistle? 
For those of us who are keeping score, in traditional public 
accommodations (the descendants of innkeepers and common 
carriers34) the law has scored a marked success against private 
discrimination in its most egregious form, race-based exclusion. 
Beyond those establishments—even though state law generally 
forbids private discrimination—the record is at best mixed. We have 
no reliable way of knowing what in terrorem effects the state civil 
rights laws may have had. We do know that in today’s world, law or 
no law, some employees will be frightened by a dark face at the door. 
In my view, however, despite the inability of these laws to protect 
against all forms of private discrimination in retail stores, they are still 
valuable—serving as deterrents in some cases, and more generally 
reaffirming the morality of inclusion. 
B. Access to Work and Its Rewards 
To call discrimination by nongovernmental employers “private 
discrimination” can be misleading. The world of work, wherever the 
work may be located, is an important part of the public life of the 
community. Work provides more than a paycheck; it is the source of a 
great many values that are less tangible, but no less important in a 
human society. Work is a vital arena for demonstrating one’s 
individual identity, in dimensions so numerous that, for many 
purposes, “you become your job.”35 One becomes known for his or 
her work habits, which may demonstrate dependability, industry, 
initiative, congeniality—all significant indicators, not just of the work 
done, but of the person. To the contrary, the absence of work is 
commonly taken to indicate irresponsibility or sloth. Beyond these 
general indices of identity, particular forms of work are commonly 
associated with degrees of power, of talent, of creativity, of learning. 
Our assumptions about those popular perceptions work their way 
 
 34. Although the 1964 Act does not speak to common carriers, those subject to federal 
regulation have been forbidden to discriminate on grounds of race since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 94 (1941), interpreting the Interstate 
Commerce Act. Today this prohibition is embodied in 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (2000). 
 35. STUDS TERKEL, WORKING 102 (1975). In this passage I draw on earlier writing. See 
Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 523, 533 (1997) (“Work shapes individual identities in ways both general and particular.”). 
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into our own assessment of the work we do—and thus a more general 
sense of our individual worth.  For the individual, work may imply 
independence, achievement, advancement up the socio-economic 
ladder, security, or esteem. Correspondingly, the absence of work 
may imply dependence on others, failure, stagnation or decline, 
insecurity, or shame. These self-evaluations, I repeat, are largely 
based on the individual’s well-founded assumptions about other 
people’s perceptions. In this sense, the workplace is a stage, and the 
personal is public. In sum, access to decent work is a badge of full 
citizenship.36 
Consider the woman who seeks to enter one of the building 
trades. Even today, although she may be allowed to join the union, 
she may well find some resistance among her fellow employees, and 
even sexual harassment in the form of denigration on the job, 
assignment to unpleasant tasks, or refusal to afford experience that 
might lead to promotion.37 Yet, after she has been on the job for some 
time, she may find that her day-to-day performance has won 
acceptance among her co-workers. The notion that “women can’t be 
plumbers”38 will recede as more and more women personify its 
negation, simply by showing up for work and doing the job well.  
The workplace is not just a stage, but also a classroom—and a  
co-educational classroom, at that. The public import of workplace 
integration, also including racial integration, is plain enough. Given 
the continued racial segregation of our urban housing,39 work has 
become the basic venue in which large numbers of Americans can 
come to know each other across such boundaries as race and sex, to 
see each other not as abstract labels but as whole people. The 
implications for group status hierarchies are huge. The African 
American policeman on the streets of Birmingham and the woman 
electrician on a construction site carry messages for all who see them, 
 
 36. JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63–101 (1991); 
see William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999) 
(noting that access to decent work is part of the “social citizenship tradition”). 
 37. These forms of conduct are common when women enter jobs historically limited to 
men, and they ought to be re cognized as sexual harassment; yet, they can be ignored, given the 
prominence of sexuality in that term’s usual applications. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing 
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1755–73 (1998) (arguing that a main motivation behind 
sexual harassment is to “denigrat[e] women’s competence for the purpose of keeping them 
away from male -dominated jobs”). 
 38. Sylvia A. Law, “Girls Can’t Be Plumbers”—Affirmative Action for Women in 
Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45, 45 (1989). 
 39. See infra Part II.A. 
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and each message proclaims not just an individual’s status but also a 
group’s entitlement to inclusion in the ranks of equal citizens. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers, both 
governmental and nongovernmental, to discriminate on grounds of 
race or sex in hiring, promotion, and other employment practices. 
Although some local government bodies (notably police and fire 
departments) continue to face lawsuits for employment 
discrimination,40 and some have recently remained under judicial 
supervision because of past discriminatory practices,41 it is fair to say 
that private employer practices are Title VII’s most important targets 
today. The very expression “Title VII” is widely known, among 
employers and employees alike. The statute’s antidiscrimination 
norm is now taken for granted, not just as a legal requirement, but as 
a moral guideline; the law’s educational effects have gone well 
beyond the local teachings of its particular applications. 
The text of Title VII clearly forbids an employer to adopt a 
practice that, on its face, discriminates against a worker because she is 
a woman, or because he is a member of a racial or ethnic minority. 
Three decades ago, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to cover 
another sort of discrimination. If an employer were engaging in a 
practice that was, on its face, race-neutral (or sex-neutral, etc.), but 
which had the effect of excluding disparate numbers of women or 
minority applicants for hiring (or promotion, etc.), then the practice 
would be considered a prima facie violation of Title VII, rebuttable 
only if employer could justify it as a job-related qualification.42 The 
mechanism of this rule for “disparate impact” cases will be familiar to 
all lawyers: protect the interest in equal opportunity by shifting the 
burden of proof to one who would deny it. Although the Supreme 
Court later backed away from this doctrine, Congress soon restored 
it.43 
 
 40. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, Latino Police Officers and City Settle Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 2004, at 33 (noting cases involving the New York City police department). 
 41. For accounts of efforts to end the  effects of consent decrees and the like, see Matt 
O’Connor, Town OKs More U.S. Hiring Oversight; Cicero Didn’t Give Enough Racial Data , 
CHI. TRIB., May 23, 2003, at 2 (Cicero, Illinois police and fire departments); Mike Donila, 
Consultant Expected to Upda te City on Promotion System, MACON TELEGRAPH, Aug. 11, 2003 
(Macon, Georgia police and fire departments); David Harper, Audit Sees Compliance With 
Decree, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 17, 2003, at A15 (Tulsa, Oklahoma police). 
 42. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 43. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1980), “overruled” by statute in 
the aptly -named Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 122-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994)). 
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So far, so good—although disparate impact cases are relatively 
few in number.44 In the overwhelmingly more likely Title VII case of 
“disparate treatment” of an individual employee, the courts continue 
to require a showing of purposeful discrimination based on the 
employee’s race (or sex, etc.) before relief can be granted.45 The 
result is to assimilate this type of employment discrimination case into 
the legal standard used in determining constitutional challenges to 
governmental action, including employment practices, under the 
equal protection clause. In such a case, the government’s action is not 
characterized as racial discrimination, and thus not subjected to 
exacting judicial scrutiny of its justifications, unless the challenging 
party shows that the action’s racially disparate effect was intended by 
the relevant government officials.46 Title VII’s parallel 
“discriminatory purpose” requirement, also a judicial invention, 
ignores a central feature of the psychology of discrimination. 
Discriminatory action is often the product of an actor who is 
unconscious of any racist purpose—and who would resent the 
suggestion that he or she wanted to inflict harm because of an 
employee’s race (or sex, etc.). Dealing with the “purpose” 
requirement in equal protection doctrine, Charles Lawrence 
persuasively made this point in general terms some years ago.47 More 
recently, Linda Hamilton Krieger has shown beyond peradventure 
how the analogous Title VII requirement, which ultimately puts the 
burden on the employee-plaintiff to prove that the asserted nonracial 
(etc.) reasons for action by an employer or supervisor are 
 
 44. One widely cited study notes that research on disparate impact cases “is extremely 
costly because disparate impact cases are quite rare.” Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-
Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 1487, 1494 n.27 (1996). 
 45. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993) (“[The plaintiff has] the 
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional 
discrimination.” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 
(1981))). 
 46. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). The Supreme Court applied this 
principle to equal protection challenges founded on sex discrimination in Personnel 
Administator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). For an illuminating analysis 
of the purposes behind this stiffening of the constitutional test, see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of 
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1110–19 (1989). 
 47. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“[A] large part of the behavior that 
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.”).  
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“pretextual,”48 fails to take account of the cognitive processes 
underlying disparate treatment in the typical employment 
discrimination case.49 
As Professor Krieger notes, it is not easy to devise doctrinal 
remedies for this state of affairs. She suggests a reformulation of 
disparate treatment doctrine in which proof by an employee-plaintiff 
that his or her group status (race, sex, etc.) “played a role [conscious 
or unconscious] in causing the employer’s action or decision” would 
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Absent a showing 
of purposeful discrimination, however, she would limit remedies to 
“individualized injunctive and other equitable relief, including back 
pay and front pay and attorneys’ fees.” Proof of conscious 
discrimination would continue to be necessary for an award of 
damages.50 I agree with Professor Krieger that her proposals could be 
adopted by the courts without amendment of the statute, but surely 
such a set of rulings is improbable in today’s environment—and if by 
some miracle they were to be given, they would soon be overturned 
by a congressional amendment to Title VII. 
II.  CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE INTERTWINING OF  
GOVERNMENT WITH PRIVATE BEHAVIOR 
It is a cliché of our time that the membrane dividing “public” and 
“private” spheres of modern society is permeable. What official 
actors do has huge effects on private choices—sometimes leaving no 
real choice at all. Private actors, in turn, not only have powerful 
effects on the making of public policy but directly “govern” the 
conduct of ordinary citizens in myriad ways. Legal scholarship over 
the last generation has repeatedly sounded this theme.51 In the 
discussion that follows, I first consider housing discrimination as a 
 
 48. On the methods of proving that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, see LEX K. 
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.04 (2d ed. 1994). 
 49. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity , 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186 (1995) 
[hereinafter Krieger, Cognitive Bias]; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: 
Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1276–91 (1998). 
 50. Krieger, Cognitive Bias, supra  note 49, at 1241–44. 
 51. Two symposia are especially noteworthy: Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003). My favorites in this distinguished body of literature are Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance , 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000), and David A. 
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).  
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case study in the interaction of public and private actor s, and—alas—
an example of the failure of civil rights law. Then, after a cursory 
catalogue of types of interconnection between governmental and 
private behaviors, I identify some rays of hope that the private sector 
itself will offer leadership toward a more inclusive society. 
A. The Neighborhood: The State, “Market Forces,” and Racial 
Isolation 
Official racial zoning has been unconstitutional since 1917,52 but 
long afterward government was still deeply involved in the 
segregation of urban neighborhoods. Three well-known examples will 
suffice. (i) For years official government guidelines for lenders 
explicitly called for “redlining” of minority neighborhoods, and the 
racial matching of applicants for housing loans with neighborhoods 
defined by their races. (ii) State-licensed brokers systematically 
steered seekers of housing into segregated neighborhoods. (iii) Local 
governments’ urban renewal and public housing programs 
accelerated the concentration of poor minority residents.53 
Aggravated by such public supports, neighborhood segregation was 
thoroughly entrenched by the time civil rights law came to address 
the field of housing. And here the scorecard for antidiscrimination 
legislation must record a failure so dismal as to dishearten the most 
optimistic observer. 
Three decades and more have passed since 1968, when Congress 
and the Supreme Court made clear that a broad range of acts of 
private housing discrimination violated federal law.54 After twenty 
years, and again after thirty years, academic symposia, while  doing 
their best to nurture hope, mostly bemoaned the continued existence 
of housing segregation at or near historically high levels.55 The easy 
 
 52. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).  
 53. On all three forms of public support for segregation, see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & 
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS 50–57 (1993). 
 54. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The Supreme Court 
made its own contribution in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., interpreting the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act to fill some gaps left by the act recently adopted by Congress. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). 
 55. See, e.g., THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY YEARS: A CONFERENCE AT THE 
YALE LAW SCHOOL 32 (Robert G. Schwenn ed., 1989) (“I also try to be realistic, however. And 
that realism tells me that it is unlikely that the nation is going to return to what some, not I, call 
the ‘free spending days’ of the Great Society.”); Symposium, Promises Kept, Promises Broken, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 925 (1998). 
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case for a legal remedy is the case of a real estate developer who 
openly refuses to sell houses to black buyers.56 But in the post-1968 
world, those easy cases are extremely rare. In the aftermath of that 
year’s changes in the law, no one will admit to racial discrimination—
partly for fear of inviting a lawsuit, and partly because the ethos of 
public life today makes it hard to admit such a purpose, even to 
oneself. 
A decade ago, Professors Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton 
comprehensively detailed the severe constraints on federal 
administrative enforcement of the Fair Housing Act; the 
disinclination of the Justice Department to bring a criminal 
prosecution absent a “pattern or practice” of discrimination or an 
issue “of general public importance”; and the difficulty of bringing 
private suits for damages by individuals who could prove 
discrimination against them. In a chapter entitled “The Failure of 
Public Policy,” Massey and Denton conclude, 
The fundamental weakness of the 1968 Fair Housing Act was its 
reliance on individual efforts to combat a social problem that was 
systemic and institutional in nature. . . . [Despite sympathetic 
interpretations by federal courts of plaintiffs’ rights to sue,] 
[i]ndividual and institutional discriminators could persist in their 
behavior, knowing that the federal government was powerless to do 
anything about it, and that in the remote possibility of a conviction, 
the financial penalties they faced were modest.57 
The authors went on to say that the 1988 amendments to the Fair 
Housing Act had “remedied the principal flaws of the 1968 act.”58 Yet 
by 2001, Denton, although she noted a modest decline of 
“hypersegregation” in growing multi-ethnic metropolitan areas, also 
noted that older metropolitan areas with large African American 
populations had seen no such change. Current demographic 
estimates, she said, suggested that these patterns would continue.59 
Even after the 1988 amendments, hardly anyone is to be found who 
believes that the law’s weapons against nondiscrimination will make 
much of a dent in residential segregation. 
 
 56. This was the factual setting for Jones, 392 U.S. at 509. 
 57. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 53, at 198, 200. 
 58. Id. at 210. 
 59. Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining 
Inequality in Wealth and Property , 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1202–05 (2001). 
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We might analogize the case of the large apartment owner or the 
housing developer to the case of the hotel that used to admit only 
whites, but responded to the 1964 Act by opening the door to all 
patrons. These are large-scale operators, who are susceptible to 
multiple legal actions and broad-ranging remedies60 and who (in 2005) 
do not want to be known as racists, even unconscious racists. But the 
discriminatory seller of an individual home, like the white 
homeowner who moves away in response to an influx of minority 
neighbors, looks more like the local employee of a retail store who 
bars the door to a single would-be patron. Each of these actors is 
likely to have a story to tell (often believed in the telling) that denies 
racial discrimination. For the typical would-be minority lessee or 
buyer subjected to one-on-one discrimination—say, one who is told 
by a state-licensed real estate agent about a house in an integrated 
neighborhood, but not about houses in virtually all-white 
neighborhoods—the discrimination may be of such low visibility that 
no one but the agent is aware of it.61 Yet, suppose the would-be lessee 
or buyer does find out. Assume, as well, that he or she is aware that 
the discrimination is unlawful.62 Filing a legal action—always risky to 
the spirit as well as the pocketbook—often will not seem worth its 
psychic  and other costs.63 And what cause of action does a successful 
minority buyer have when, two months later, a white neighbor moves 
 
 60. Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable 
Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 909, 931–32 (1991). 
As Professor Armstrong notes, individual actions against other defendants have failed to 
achieve much integration. Id. at 915–26. 
 61. On the incidence of such unlawful steering as measured by black and white “testers,” 
see Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Neighborhood Choice: Evidence of Racial and Ethnic 
Steering in Urban Housing Ma rkets, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT 
OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA  117, 125–36 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993). 
 62. In the case posed, chances are good that the would-be lessee or buyer will know that 
this sort of racial or ethnic steering is unlawful. Beyond the screamingly clear case, however, 
public awareness declines. See Martin D. Abravanel, Public Knowledge of Fair Housing Law: 
Does It Protect Against Housing Discrimination? , 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 469, 480 (2002) 
(“With the exception of one category of discrimination, a majority of the public correctly 
identified as unlawful the behavior of landlords, home sellers, real estate agents, and mortgage 
lenders when it is described to them . . . . However, across the scenarios that depict 
discriminatory conduct, there is considerable variation as to the size of that majority, which 
ranges from substantial to modest.”).  
 63. An individual complaint against an agent may, however, persuade a local fair housing 
group to seek injunctive relief broadly applying to the agent’s future treatment of other minority 
applicants. Armstrong, supra note 60, at 933–34. This injunctive approach, for all its promise, 
seems not to have made a major impact on segregation as of 2001, the year of Denton’s article. 
See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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away? The latter form of housing discrimination lies beyond the reach 
of any legal remedy.64 Even for clear-cut violations of housing 
discrimination law, governmental enforcement is pathetically weak.65 
Unsurprisingly, “[h]ousing discrimination persists nationwide and is 
severely underreported.”66 
The governmental authorities in suburbs that serve as 
destinations for “white flight” can play a role in intensifying the racial 
isolation of the cities from which white families have fled. One means 
of preserving a suburb’s racial mix (that is, the absence of mix) is to 
resist the development of low-income housing affordable by minority 
families. A famous example was the town of Penfield, New York, a 
white suburb of Rochester.67 Penfield had a zoning ordinance that 
effectively excluded such a development. When some low-income 
members of racial and ethnic minorities sued, urging that the 
discriminatory effects of the ordinance were just what the town 
officials intended, the Supreme Court held that they lacked the sort of 
injury that would give them standing to sue. Justice Lewis F. Powell 
wrote for the majority. True, two builders had applied for rezoning, to 
allow them to build low- and moderate-income housing. But, said 
Justice Powell, 
the record is devoid of any indication that these projects, or other 
like projects, would have satisfied petitioners’ needs at prices they 
could afford. . . . Indeed, petitioners’ descriptions of their individual 
financial situations and housing needs suggest precisely the 
contrary—that their inability to reside in Penfield is the 
 
 64. On the role of agents, emphasizing their opportunities and incentives for 
discrimination, see JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING 
COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 161–82 (1995). 
 65. For the multiple reasons why, see Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of 
Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1438–51 (1998). In 
1998, the U.S. government filed a grand total of 56 complaints against acts of housing 
discrimination. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS 
COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1990–98, at 4 (2000). 
 66. NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, 2002  FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 1 (2002), 
at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/html/trends/report.pdf. See also National Fair Housing 
Alliance, Less Than One Percent of Illegal Housing Discrimination Reported, According to New 
Report by National Fair Housing Alliance, US NEWSWIRE, April 16, 2003, at 
http://release s.usnewswire.com/getrelease.asp?id=15011 (“Thirty five years after the passage of 
the Fair Housing Act, discrimination persists virtually unchallenged.”).  
 67. I have taken the substance of this paragraph on Warth from an earlier discussion. 
Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality , 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1988). 
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consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather 
than of respondents’ assertedly illegal acts.68 
The “economics” of housing in Penfield is here treated as a fact of 
nature, on the order of the town’s distance from Lake Ontario. But 
the government of Penfield itself had helped to shape the local 
housing supply, precisely by adopting and maintaining the 
exclusionary zoning law before the Court. One might have described 
the minority plaintiffs’ alleged injury as the denial of a chance to 
enter a housing market that had not been so structured by official 
action. But these plaintiffs, said the Court, had no standing to sue. 
The result, of course, is the further concentration of minority poor in 
Rochester. Too bad about those market forces. 
The case of Penfield is merely one illustration of a larger point: 
lawmakers, including judges, are strongly disinclined to find any 
public responsibility for the private “choices” that aggravate racial 
isolation. The most serious harms of the detachment of minority poor 
from the larger community are the harms of neighborhood poverty. 
These harms are both intense and widespread, with each severe 
problem engendering other severe problems in a process that is not so 
much circular as spherical. Poor, racially isolated neighborhoods are 
mostly served by poor schools, where children have little motivation 
to study because their everyday surroundings emphasize the absence 
of jobs and the charms of quick money from the drug trade. The 
criminal justice system comes to bear on young minority males with a 
vengeance, ruining their futures in the employment market and the 
marriage market. And the young women? Well, the moralists heap 
obloquy on them for having children outside marriage. This is not the 
place to take on the whole grim subject of concentrated poverty in 
minority communities, but the reader will get the point.69 
“Housing discrimination,” in this context, is a watered-down 
name for one element in a vicious cycle.70 If you want to live in a nice 
 
 68. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 506 (1975). 
 69. A good beginning in the literature is WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK 
DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 25–86 (1996). I skimmed the surface of 
the subject, citing a number of relevant works, in Kenneth L. Karst, Poverty and Rights: A Pre-
Millennial Triptych, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 407–20 (2002). On urban 
poverty as socialization, see Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of 
Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967, 1011–20 (2003). 
 70. For analysis of studies of the interactions highlighted here, see YINGER, supra note 64, 
at 135–58 (chapter entitled “The Impact of Housing Discrimination on Education, Employment, 
and Poverty”). 
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neighborhood, you need a good job. To get a good job, you need a 
good education. To get your children into a good school, the one clear 
avenue is to live in a nice neighborhood. An effort to use law to 
attack any given point in the cycle is turned away with a statement 
that someone else is responsible. It isn’t the owner’s fault that you 
can’t afford to buy her house. It isn’t the employer’s fault that your 
education is deficient. It isn’t the school system’s fault that the school 
is located in an area where crime looks like a more certain path to 
wealth than preparing for a nonexistent job . . . . And, of course, the 
state is not responsible for “private” discriminations made by “the 
market”—even though public institutions, including the law, have 
provided essential platforms for those decisions.71 In short, the myriad 
official and nongovernmental decisions that add up to racial isolation 
in poor neighborhoods have myriad effects—grave, life-destroying 
effects that are obscured by an insipid label like “housing 
discrimination.” These harms come down on people one by one, but 
they also contribute to the status degradation of groups. 
With neighborhood integration in mind, commentators have 
suggested alternative strategies of quite a different kind: to educate 
the public in ways designed to destabilize racial categories,72 to 
engage more generally in a fight against institutional racism,73 or at 
least to expose institutional racism for all to see.74 These suggestions 
have in common the assumption that, in the field of housing, law 
reform is unlikely to work until much deeper reforms of mind and 
spirit are achieved. The authors’ despair seems justified, but in this 
chilly season for civil rights, the deeper reforms seem even more 
distant. 
 
 71. For an illuminating critique, going far beyond the scope of the discussion in the text 
above, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody’s Market: The Political 
Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 247, 278–84 (2000) (criticizing Warth v. Seldin as part of a more generalized 
contraction of justiciability). 
 72. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: 
Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1635 
(1995). 
 73. John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. 
MIAMI . L. REV. 1067, 1128–29 (1998). 
 74. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1659, 1678–80 (1995) (calling for reports on the likely impact on racial segregation of 
proposed land-use decisions, such as highway building, or resource allocations, by analogy to 
environmental impact statements). 
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Another proposed remedy is to seek a distinct sort of “spatial 
equality” by using public resources to enhance existing minority 
neighborhoods.75 This proposal has two clear virtues. It is not 
vulnerable to the “white flight” that so commonly has followed 
substantial minority entry into formerly all-white neighborhoods, and 
it does not make the paternalist assumption that what the members of 
racial and ethnic minorities need, to make their lives worthwhile, is 
closer proximity to whites. It also has the political advantage—I will 
not call this a “virtue”—of not threatening the lily-whiteness of the 
suburbs. However, given the desperation for funds among local and 
state governments, it may be some time before we can expect public 
agencies to take on the burden of such efforts. Cooperative 
public/private initiatives may be another matter, as I show in this 
Essay’s concluding discussion. 
B. Public-Private Interconnections: A Short String of Assertive 
Platitudes 
What follows in this Section is nothing new. A reader with any 
experience with the “public-private” literature in law or political 
science is advised to skip to Section II.C. Here I merely state, without 
supporting argument but with a few references, a series of 
illustrations of the cliché I outlined before:76 Today the public and 
private sectors of American life are elaborately interconnected, each 
affecting the other in so many ways that the very conception of a 
distinction between public and private spheres, while useful and even 
necessary for some purposes,77 has a great capacity to mislead if taken 
too literally. 
In the years since the Great Depression and World War II, the 
size and functions of government in America have grown rapidly to 
their present vast extensions. Responding to a correspondingly rapid 
expansion in citizens’ expectations, government has taken on major 
 
 75. John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-
Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1495 (1993).  
 76. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 77. See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 51 (“Without a private sphere in which 
individual decisions are not attributable to the government, the very concept of an individual 
right loses its meaning.”); Kenneth L. Karst, State Action—Beyond Race, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE AMERICAN CONST. 2491, 2492 (Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, & Adam Winkler 
eds., 2d ed. 2000) (“It is hard to see how American constitutionalism could get along without 
some form of the publicprivate [sic] distinction, absent a fundamental transformation of the idea 
of constitutionalism.”).  
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responsibilities for maintaining economic prosperity, and for 
promoting the public’s health, welfare, and education. Privately 
owned and operated institutions play central roles in defining tasks 
for government and in carrying out public functions. Much of the 
work of modern government consists in collecting money from 
nongovernmental sources via taxes and other means, and in 
distributing money to individuals and private institutions. 
Government distributions can take the form of direct or indirect 
subsidies, employment of labor, purchases of goods, or “contracting 
out” of services. Government regulations (or the abandonment of 
existing regulations) can have huge consequences for private 
interests, because virtually every regulation of private conduct has 
some wealth-distributive effect. For all these reasons, private interests 
spend enormous amounts of money on lobbying and other political 
expenditures, to promote the election and further support of officials 
who are in a position to train the government’s distributive hose in 
their direction.78 Of course, whatever action an official may take in 
response to these efforts, he or she will describe the action in the 
language of “the public interest.” 
A handful of quotations, spanning half a century of scholarship, 
will round out this illustrative effort: 
1952: “The modern state, having ultimate responsibility for the 
national economy, necessarily sought the production of conditions 
by industry which would satisfy the political demands. A variety of 
tools lie to the hand of the political state. It can impose 
requirements. . . . It can supply capital. It can, if need be, own 
businesses, and as an ultimate resource can take over almost any 
given corporation (of significant scope) in any industry. . . . The 
solutions [of crises resulting from applications of these tools] have 
taken form i n law.” 79 
 
 78. In 1994 Kevin Phillips pointed out that some 90,000 persons in Washington were 
engaged in or supporting lobby ing, producing a “feeding frenzy” seeking federal funds, 
favorable congressional legislation, or both. KEVIN PHILLIPS, ARROGANT CAPITAL: 
WASHINGTON, WALL STREET, AND THE FRUSTRATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 89 (1994). On 
“the privatization of American public life,” see also MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 240–42, 278–81 (1998). 
 79. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity —Protection of 
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 933–34, 943 
(1952) (including antitrust law as one of several means by which legal doctrine 
“constitutionalizes” concentrated corporate power). 
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1975: “A large number of institutions has been created in the U.S. 
almost wholly dependent on the public treasury for continued 
support, and other more traditional institutions in society have 
become partly dependent on public support.”80 
2000: “A variety of nongovernmental actors, including corporations, 
public interest organizations, private standard setting bodies, 
professional associations, and nonprofit groups, engage in ‘public’ 
decision making in myriad ways. Nongovernmental actors perform 
‘legislative’ and ‘adjudicative’ roles, along with many others, in a 
broad variety of regulatory contexts. They set standards, provide 
services, and deliver benefits. In addition, they help implement, 
monitor, and enforce compliance with regulations. 
Nongovernmental organizations exert, in the context of a larger 
network of relationships, coercive power. A careful inquiry into the 
private role in governance reveals not only its pervasiveness, but 
also the extent to which it operates symbiotically with public 
authority.”81 
2002: “[Government activity] now embraces a dizzying array of 
loans, loan guarantees, grants, contracts, social regulation, economic 
regulation, insurance, tax expenditures, vouchers, and more. . . . [A] 
major share—in many cases the major share—of the discretion over 
the operation of public programs routinely comes to rest not with 
the responsible governmental agencies, but with the third-party 
actors that actually carry the programs out.”82 
 
 80. Bruce L. P. Smith, The Public Use of the Private Sector, in THE NEW POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1, 21 (Bruce L. P. Smith ed., 1975). For 
a 1975 account of military procurement that sounds eerily like a present-day description, see 
Martin Edmonds, Accountability and the Military -Industrial Complex, in THE NEW POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra , at 148. 
The temptations of conflicts of interest in the field of military procurement have been 
widely known for decades. What is new is public recognition of similar temptations in the field 
of research by the National Institutes of Health. For some horrifying examples, thoroughly 
documented, see David Willman, Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical 
Research (pts. 1–6), L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at A1, A32–35. This multifaceted story deserves a 
place in textbooks on public choice theory. 
 81. Freeman, supra note 51, at 547. 
 82. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 2 
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). 
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2003: “Congress now routinely authorizes and federal agencies now 
administer most of domestic policy through state and local agencies, 
for-profit firms, and nonprofit organizations.” 83 
Enough said. 
C. The Stake of Nongovernmental Actors in an Inclusive Society 
In a “globalized” era when American manufacturers by the 
hundreds are exporting jobs to Mexico and Malaysia and beyond, at 
first blush it may seem silly to suggest that important players in the 
private sector may be willing to take action in the interest of a more 
inclusive society. But the field of civil rights has produced some 
private choices along just those lines. Two such instances, separated 
by a quarter century, involved different kinds of affirmative action, 
differently motivated. 
Three decades ago, the craft workers in Kaiser Aluminum’s 
workforce were almost all white—no surprise, given that craft hiring 
was limited to persons with previous craft experience, and the craft 
unions had long excluded black workers. This pattern of racial 
segregation might well have established a prima facie “disparate 
impact” case against Kaiser (or the steelworkers’ union, or both) in 
an action under Title VII by black candidates for craft jobs. It also 
jeopardized Kaiser’s federal government contracts.84 In the shadow of 
the law, in 1974 Kaiser and the United Steelworkers entered into a 
labor contract providing for a new craft training program, including 
an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial 
imbalances in craft employment. The plan called for selection for the 
training program to be based generally on worker seniority but 
reserved 50 percent of the openings for black workers. Predictably, 
some black workers were selected over some white workers with 
greater seniority, and one of the latter brought suit, claiming a 
violation of Title VII. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber85 
the Supreme Court (7–2) rejected this claim and upheld the 
affirmative action program.86 Both the language of Title VII and the 
law’s legislative history gave credence to Justice Rehnquist’s 
 
 83. John J. DiIulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview , 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1271, 1271 (2003). 
 84. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance had criticized Kaiser. United Steelworkers 
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979).  
 85. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).  
 86. Id. at 197. 
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argument in dissent that the majority had misapplied the statute, but 
the Court, while recognizing the force of those arguments, insisted 
that Title VII’s fundamental purpose was “to break down old patterns 
of racial segregation and hierarchy” and to “open employment 
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been 
traditionally closed to them”87—the very purposes of the plan before 
the Court. 
If one were looking for an example of the intertwining of public 
and private power in shaping a piece of the social order, it would be 
hard to find a better one than this affirmative action plan. Kaiser and 
the Steelworkers were (and remain) two important loci of private 
economic power. They had taken their step toward a racially inclusive 
force of craft workers at a time when similarly directed government 
action—either by a court, enforcing Title VII, or by the executive 
branch, enforcing the policy of nondiscrimination by government 
contractors—was a real possibility. Even so, the Court made clear 
that the validity of a “voluntary” affirmative action program by a 
private employer did not depend on whether the program was 
motivated by fear of this sort of liability.88 Today the Court’s decision 
remains very much alive as a Title VII precedent. 
In June 2003 the Supreme Court decided another affirmative 
action case in which important private actors played a vital role. In 
the University of Michigan law school case, Grutter v. Bollinger,89 a 
great many big centers of private power—collectively seen as a proxy 
for the American Establishment—weighed in as amici curiae in 
support of the school’s diversity admissions program.90 The import of 
one such brief, by the Association of American Law Schools, might 
be discounted on the ground that most of the universities in the 
association had a direct financial interest; they might lose federal 
subsidies if their law schools’ affirmative action programs violated the 
law. But several other briefs, filed by major private players, had a 
tenor and a persuasive power that were altogether different. The brief 
that drew the most attention was filed by a number of former military 
 
 87. See id. at 208 (in the latter passage quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey, a leading 
sponsor, during the Senate’s debate preceding Title VII’s adoption). 
 88. Id. at 208 n.8. 
 89. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 90. Scores of briefs amici curiae were filed on both sides of this case and its companion, 
Gratz v. Bollinger, which invalidated the same university’s undergraduate admissions program 
on the ground that it too closely rese mbled a racial quota, 539 U.S. 244, 250 (2003). 
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and naval officers of the highest rank, along with a number of 
decorated war heroes with later experience in high governmental 
office, former supervisors of the service academies, and former high 
defense officials of all administrations going back through that of 
President Reagan.91 The brief caught the Justices’ attention for the 
same reason it was reported in the newspapers: most of these amici 
were famous people. Their brief reminded the Supreme Court of the 
racial tensions, including violence, in the armed services during the 
Vietnam years, and noted what the services had learned from that 
painful experience: an integrated corps of enlisted personnel needs an 
integrated leadership. The service academies had affirmative action 
programs that they wanted to preserve, and the amici pointed out that 
college ROTC programs also needed to draw from integrated pools 
of students.92 The brief called the services’ situation “a microcosm of 
what exists in our society at large”93 and emphasized the importance 
of affirmative action as an avenue to leadership roles in all major 
public and private institutions. Broad access to those roles, said these 
representatives of the defense establishment, is needed for public 
confidence in our institutions and for the success of those institutions’ 
missions. 
Another brief, filed by General Motors Corporation (GM), 
focused a similar argument on the leadership of American business.94 
After reaffirming the original rationale for diversity admissions—
improving the quality of education—GM referred to the need for 
diversified leadership in GM’s own management, and in the whole 
corporate world. “A stratified work force, in which whites dominate 
the highest levels of the managerial corps and minorities dominate 
the labor corps, may foment racial divisiveness. It would also be 
retrogressive, eliminating many of the productivity gains businesses 
have made through intensive efforts to eradicate discrimination and 
improve relations among workers of different races. . . . [V]aluing 
 
 91. Consolidated Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-2411) and Gratz  v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-
516), available at http://www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/um/MilitaryL-
both.pdf. 
 92. General Colin Powell is perhaps the Nation’s best known ROTC graduate. 
 93. Consolidated Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 9, Grutter 
(No. 02-2411) and Gratz (No. 02-516). 
 94. Brief of Amicus Curiae General Motors Corporation, Grutter (No. 02-2411) and Gratz 
(No. 02-516). 
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diversity has helped [the businesses’] bottom line.”95 Adding to the 
force of GM’s argument was a brief amici curiae filed by a consortium 
of 65 giant American companies with combined revenues well over a 
trillion dollars.96 Yet another brief, filed by the AFL-CIO, stressed 
the same point, but from the perspective of workers on the shop floor: 
the need for integrated business leadership in order to further the 
compelling interest in minimizing employment discrimination based 
on race or ethnicity.97 
From Weber in 1979 to Grutter in 2003, we find private 
individuals and groups placing their weight behind policies aimed 
achieving more inclusive institutional norms. If in Weber Kaiser and 
the union were supporting a more inclusive corps of craft personnel 
because they feared governmental intervention, in Grutter the former 
military officials, the big companies, and the union were—entirely 
voluntarily—seeking to nudge the Supreme Court toward policies 
designed to improve the inclusiveness of leadership cadres in major 
American institutions both public and private. The world of business 
and labor has taken a turn or two since 1979; one instructive irony is 
that the list of 65 companies that joined as amici in Grutter includes 
the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. 
It remains to ask, what is it that drives powerful representatives 
of the private sector to support what they see as policies designed to 
enhance equal citizenship at ground level? What can be done, by 
private or public actors, to encourage that sort of private support? 
Those two questions are the central concern of my final topic. 
Undoubtedly, some companies’ top management today remain 
concerned about potential liability under Title VII for employment 
discrimination.98 The $175 million settlement paid by Texaco in the 
mid-1990s serves as a vivid cautionary tale.99 But avoiding liability is 
 
 95. Id. at 24. 
 96. Brief of Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses, Grutter (No. 02-2411) and 
Gratz (No. 02-516). 
 97. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, Grutter (No. 02-2411) and Gratz (No. 02-516). 
 98. In 1998 some 21,450 cases, 8.4 percent of all federal civil cases filed, were employment 
discrimination cases. Wendy Bliss, The Wheel of Misfortune, HR MAGAZINE, May 2000, at 207, 
207. 
 99. See Shari Caudron, Don’t Make Texaco’s $175 Million Mistake, WORKFORCE, Mar. 
1997, at 59, 59 (describing Texaco’s “diversity debacle”). On Texaco’s swift adoption of an 
ambitious diversity program, emphasizing hiring and career development, and calling for 
systematic feedback to supervisors and accountability of leadership at all levels—what the Rev. 
Jesse Jackson called Texaco’s voyage from “tragedy to triumph”—see MARGARET A. HART, 
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only part of the reason why, by 1996, some 74 percent of the Fortune 
500 companies had instituted diversity initiatives, looking not only to 
minority hiring and promotions but also to the job satisfaction of 
minority employees and the growing purchasing power of minority 
communities.100 An example is BankBoston; the bank’s director of 
workforce effectiveness, speaking of the relation of the company’s 
ambitious diversity efforts, took note of “a strong link [connecting] 
employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and shareholder 
value.”101 About a decade ago the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission 
cited a study of factors relating to the hiring and advancement of 
women and minorities in the Standard and Poor 500 companies. The 
researchers found that the stock performance (annualized return) of 
the 100 companies making the strongest efforts toward equal 
employment opportunity (EEO) was 2.5 times greater than that of 
100 companies that rated lowest in EEO effort.102 The echo we hear is 
the language about “the bottom line” in GM’s brief in the Grutter 
case. 
The argument for the diversification of colleges (private as well 
as public) on the ground that it will serve to integrate leadership 
groups is a reminder that most of the individuals thus integrated, by 
definition, will be leaders. Even the enforcement of laws against 
discrimination in employment (private as well as public) will mainly 
benefit workers, or would-be workers, who are prepared to take 
 
MANAGING DIVERSITY FOR SUSTAINED COMPETITIVENESS 19–21 (Conference Bd., Report 
No. 1195-97-CH, 1997). 
 100. Caudron, supra note 99, at 60–61. By the estimate of one professional counselor, 
however, a great many of these  plans are largely nominal; only about 15 percent are what the 
counselor calls “qua lity EEO and diversity programs.” Id. 
 101. Id. at 62. 
 102. FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: 
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 14 (1995) [hereinafter GOOD FOR 
BUSINESS]. According to the Conference Board, a number of companies, recognizing this link, 
have tied executive compensation and bonuses to the achievement of the companies’ diversity 
goals. See HART, supra note 99, at 7–8 (noting such ties at DuPont and Phillip Morris). Now, we 
are really talking about “interest convergence.” See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma , 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522–23 (1980) 
(focusing on the search for equality and racial neutrality post -Brown). 
For an exploration of factors that managers should consider as they seek to reap the 
advantages of a diverse corps of employees, see generally TAYLOR COX, JR., CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH & PRACTICE (1993). For the views of top 
corporate leaders on essential practical measures along these lines, see HART, supra note 99, at 
6–12 (statements by leaders of DuPont, Quaker Oats, General Motors, Philip Morris, and 
General Electric). See also GOOD FOR BUSINESS, supra, at 38–56 (describing characteristics of 
successful corporate diversity practices and programs). 
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advantage of employment opportunities—prepared, that is, by 
schooling or by some other training or experience. Neither of these 
forms of civil rights action—not affirmative action, and not 
antidiscrimination law—has much immediate value for the minority 
poor who are concentrated in our inner cities, the ones William Julius 
Wilson called “the truly disadvantaged.”103 Worse still, as Wilson has 
shown, the desperation of our poorest neighborhoods has a way of 
reproducing itself.104 In other words, the remedies that are the main 
stock-in-trade of civil rights lawyers leave wholly untouched the 
cruelest and most disgraceful conditions in American society. That 
these conditions are to be found in every one of the Nation’s largest 
cities is a major part of the disgrace. 
Well, you may say, civil rights programs can’t do everything; 
what about poverty programs? The only sensible response is this: the 
alleviation of poverty in our inner cities lies at the heart of the 
guarantee of equal citizenship. This is a civil rights goal of the first 
importance—and it deserves a prominent place in the civil rights 
canon. 
Given today’s climate for constitutional doctrine, it is vain to 
suppose that the Supreme Court will soon embrace an affirmative 
duty of government to relieve even severe, race-related poverty of the 
sort found in our inner cities. So, I do not repeat earlier arguments 
along those lines.105 What remains is to take note of a movement in 
antipoverty action and scholarship that is closely connected with our 
subject: the mobilization of the private sector in support of equal 
citizenship at ground level. After some false starts, the community 
economic development (CED) movement gathered new strength in 
the 1990s, with various forms of financial aid106 sponsored by the 
national government. Community-based nonprofit organizations 
(CBOs) proliferated, especially in poor areas in large cities. These 
nongovernmental organizations107 can be seen as a form of local 
 
 103. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 115 (1987); see also id. at 15–16, 112–18, 121–24. 
 104. The structural foundations of this systematic disadvantage are the central subject of 
Wilson’s WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra  note 69. 
 105. E.g., Karst, supra note 67, at 31–49; see supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 106. Some forms of financial aid included grants, tax credits, and loan gua rantees. 
 107. In some discussions, particularly by British authors, organizations like these are called 
quasi-nongovernmental organizations (“quangos”), because of their close relationships with 
government—for example, the British Council. See also Quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organization, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-autonomous_non-government_ 
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economic self-help, in a model first made famous in Booker T. 
Washington’s writings and actions.108 The model has found modern 
support from the Reagan and Clinton administrations.109 The CBOs 
have seen themselves as accountable primarily to local residents. 
They promote, and sometimes co-own, local enterprises largely 
controlled by nonprofit private groups. The enterprises are aimed at 
economic development that shows promise of improving the 
residents’ housing, employment, or business opportunities.110 
This form of market-based CED movement, as Scott Cummings 
notes, has resonated “both with conservative proponents of free 
market principles and progressive advocates of localized 
empowerment strategies.”111 Accordingly, it has sought to deploy 
public resources as leverage to induce private investment aimed at the 
goals just noted. The movement’s emphasis on localism has included 
not only an ingredient of “local control” (a term that had 
considerable vogue a generation ago) but, more importantly, a 
commitment to the local community as what a lawyer might call the 
real party in interest, or the beneficiary in a trust relationship.112 As 
one might expect, achieving these aims is a complex process. It faces 
challenges not just in the local communities’ general economic and 
political weakness, but also in the exigencies of local politics, and 
even in the complications of politics within the enterprises 
themselves. Nonetheless, the CED movement has scored some 
notable successes. William Simon has carefully and sympathetically 
analyzed the experience to date; although he recognizes the limits of 
the CED movement, he especially applauds the movement’s efforts to 
democratize decisions through mechanisms of local community 
 
organisation (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (providing the U.K. governmental definition of the 
term). 
 108. AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880–1915: RACIAL IDEOLOGIES IN 
THE AGE OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 100–20 (1963). 
 109. An excellent guide here is Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as 
Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
399, 409–21 (2001) (covering the early history of the movement); see also id. at 421–29 
(describing developments from 1980 to 2000). 
 110. Another indispensable source is WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT (2000). On this occasion it is fitting to note that Simon’s publisher 
is the Duke University Press. 
 111. Cummings, supra note 109, at 437. 
 112. Id. at 442–46. 
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control.113 The movement has also engendered a forceful criticism 
from within; strong adherents to the goals of the movement have 
argued that it has been inadequate to its task, failing to increase 
significantly the employment of the inner city poor or the provision of 
affordable housing—in short, benefiting private investors more than 
the local population. Indeed, these critics argue that market-based 
CED has ignored the goal of distributive justice and undermined local 
political power. The latter effect, the critics say, flows from CED’s 
tendencies to depoliticize the process of community improvement and 
to deflect local residents from seeking broader structural reforms by 
making alliances with others such as labor unions and the white 
poor.114 
The main concern here is the enlistment of the private sector ’s 
resources in the cause of a more inclusive society, and the CBOs that 
have dominated the CED movement are (in form) part of the private 
sector, although their programs, relying on governmental subsidies or 
tax credits for private investors, are public-private hybrids. But 
another more recent movement aims to achieve similar purposes by a 
mechanism that the term “private sector” more typically brings to 
mind. The main premise of this movement is that the profit motive 
can be harnessed to the revival of poor urban communities by 
inducing private business interests to make use of what Michael 
Porter (of the Harvard Business School), in a now-celebrated 1995 
article, called the competitive advantage of the inner city.115 Professor 
Porter is no romantic; he recognizes the primacy for businesses of 
“bottom line” imperatives, just as GM did in supporting affirmative 
action programs at the University of Michigan. He argues that the 
inner cities have several types of advantage that should appeal to 
private investment: “strategic location, local market demand, 
integration with [locally variable] regional clusters, and human 
resources.”116 He has given much of his recent energies to putting the 
theory into practice through studies and projects organized by the 
Institute for A Competitive Inner City (ICIC).117 Self-described 
 
 113. See SIMON, supra note 110, at 1–5 (introducing the ideas of the CED movement). This 
work deserves to be read in full by anyone interested in the revitalization of poor urban 
communities. I have not even begun to suggest the richness of Simon’s analysis.  
 114. See Cummings, supra note 109, at 447–64 (describing the critique). 
 115. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City , HARV. BUS. REV., 
May-June 1995, at 55. 
 116. Id. at 57. 
 117. The Institute’s web site is http://www.icic.org. 
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friendly critics, agreeing generally with Porter’s emphases on clusters, 
regional linkages, and job training, fault him for giving insufficient 
credit to some governments and some CBOs for their past and 
ongoing successes along just these lines.118 As the critics welcome the 
current wave of CED founded on for-profit institutions, they also call 
for a strong version of public-private collaboration in the 
establishment of new inner-city enterprises.119 
Porter’s views have evolved since 1995, and he has lauded CBOs 
for their contributions to local development, calling on them to 
“move to the next stage,” focusing “on private, for-profit 
initiatives.”120 CBOs, in his view, do have roles to play in identifying 
real estate suitable for development; helping to broker inter-business 
connections; facilitating access to banks and other sources of 
financing; helping to deflect local resentment of the for-profit 
enterprises; and helping to connect local residents to the new inner-
city jobs created by development.121 He has not seen CBOs as 
candidates for significant control over local development, however. In 
short, this is market-based CED without the control by local 
community groups, and Professor Cummings has recently criticized it 
for being no more likely than the predecessor version of CED to 
address the political bases of the isolation of the minority poor.122 
Like the other friendly critics, Cummings does not reject the Porter 
thesis out of hand. He expressly endorses its concerns to promote the 
economy of the local community by remedies with a broader regional 
reach;123 its emphasis on creating business enterprises in the local 
 
 118. See Bennett Harrison & Amy K. Glasmeier, Response, Why Business Alone Won’t 
Redevelop the Inner City: A Friendly Critique of Michael Porter’s Approach to Urban 
Revitalization , 11 ECON. DEV. Q. 28, 31–32, 33–34 (1997). 
 119. They also recommend that Porter expand his analysis to take account of recent 
scholarship on (i) the possible limiting effects of technological change on the utility of the 
“clusters” approach, and (ii) the ways in which firms learn by doing. Id. at 32–33, 35–36. The 
spirit of these parts of the critique is, indeed, friendly, and it is predictable that Porter will be 
receptive. 
 120. Michael E. Porter, New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development, 11 ECON. 
DEV. Q. 11, 17 (1997). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Scott L. Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A Response to Porter’s Competitive 
Advantage Thesis, 82 OR. L .REV. 901, 902–04 (2004). 
 123. Id. For some success stories, see BRUCE J. KATZ, REVIVING CITIES: THINK 
METROPOLITAN (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief #33, 1998), at http://www.brookings.org/ 
comm/policybriefs/pb33.htm (last visited June 27, 2005). See also Antonio R. Villaraigosa, 
America’s Urban Agenda: A View from California, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 2000, at 46, 46–
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community that are sustainable because they “produce for outside as 
well as inside demand”;124 and its targeting of job training aimed at 
the projected employment needs of the businesses and industries 
established in the community. The latter goal responds to the “skills 
mismatch” identified in Wilson’s writings.125 It is the political 
dimension of CED that divides Porter and Cummings. Porter sees 
government aid as necessary to improve the business environment 
(controlling crime, improving public schools, offering worker training, 
upgrading roads and other aspects of infrastructure—and, above all, 
“streamlining regulation,” thus removing obstacles to investment).126 
Cummings would add a different set of concerns about local politics 
that, he argues, are essential to do equity in the community. Here he 
invokes arguments commonly seen in the literature of housing 
discrimination—for example, government’s historic role in creating 
and maintaining the geographical isolation of the minority poor.127 
Further, Cummings calls for new political forms of regional 
coordination: for example, in the distribution of federal financial aid, 
and in the location of higher-growth industries that are also the 
source of high-wage jobs.128 He says that market-based CED carries 
the risk of concentrating low-wage jobs in the inner cities, as local 
governments compete to give tax breaks to businesses that produce 
high property tax revenues.129 He calls for a “politically engaged 
CED” in which neighborhood-based groups have a voice in 
 
49 (suggesting states take an active role in promoting revitalization of metropolitan areas), 
available at http://www.brookings.org/press/REVIEW/summer2000/ villaraigosa.htm. 
 124. Cummings, supra note 122, at 909. 
 125. See supra notes 103 and 104. 
 126. Porter, supra note 120, at 17. 
 127. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 128. On the necessity of regional planning and programming for the institutional reforms 
essential to CED’s goals of distributive justice, see Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: 
Community Economic Development and the Case for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 131, 131–48 (2004).  
For an elaborate argument for a “new regionalism” that recognizes the necessity for 
networks of metropolitan dimension in the economic development of inner cities (and, not 
incidentally, for the deployment of suburban resources to that end), see MANUEL PASTOR, JR., 
ET AL., REGIONS THAT WORK: HOW CITIES AND SUBURBS CAN GROW TOGETHER 4–11 
(2000). This study surveys growth patterns in a number of American metropolitan areas, id. at 
125–54, offers considerable detail on greater Los Ang eles, id. at 17–78, and spells out a policy 
program that has a lot in common with Cummings’s recommendations. 
 129. The classic example is the “big box” retailer that contributes handsomely to a city’s 
property tax revenues because its buildings and parking lots occupy a huge area—and pays most 
employees at extremely low levels.  
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development strategies,130 and he cites the prominent success of one 
such project: the participation of the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for 
Economic Justice in the planning of the Staples Center in Los 
Angeles.131 He uses this joint effort to illustrate two propositions: first, 
that the active participation of CBOs can facilitate rather than hinder 
development decisions; and second, that this cooperation can lead to 
forms of development that benefit local residents with higher-wage 
jobs.132 In sum, Cummings seeks not to undermine the Porter thesis 
but to add a political element in the interest of developmental 
equity—that is, distributive justice. It is uncertain whether this 
argument will be wholly persuasive to Porter and his Institute, but 
they have made clear that they value collaboration of for-profit 
businesses with CBOs.133 At the very least, it would seem both 
economically and politically prudent for the sponsors of a for-profit 
enterprise to take the initiative, actively seeking the help of the local 
CBO in performing the functions Porter has suggested for them. 
Once the CBO is involved, it can raise—in the spirit of cooperation, if 
the CBO’s leaders are themselves prudent—such questions as the 
Figueroa Corridor group raised concerning the Staples Center.134 
The ambitious program of the ICIC begins in research and is well 
on the way to producing an impressive national data base that will aid 
inner-city CED programs of all stripes.135 In addition to its research, 
ICIC offers advice, encouragement, and (in some cases) its own 
investment in development projects in the inner cities. The 
momentum of this organization—which has become a movement all 
its own—is such that we can expect the funding of a large number of 
new market-based CED projects in the near future. Given the current 
paucity of public resources, especially in state and local governments, 
these ICIC-inspired projects may well be the most significant new 
 
 130. Cummings, supra note 122, at 905. 
 131. Id. at 922–23. 
 132. The Staples Center is a multi-purpose arena for indoor sports, concerts, and other 
entertainment. The Figueroa Corridor Coalition included “community organizations, 
neighborhood developers, unions, and environmental groups.” Id. at 923. 
 133. Professor Porter has lauded community-based organizations (CBO) for their 
contributions to local development. He worries, however, that CBOs’ insistence on the hiring of 
local residents can drive companies away. Porter, supra note 120, at 21. 
 134. For some instructive examples of this kind of cooperation, see Angela Glover 
Blackwell, Promoting Equitable Development, 34 IND. L. REV. 1273, 1285–87 (2001).  
 135. For a taste of these data, see the impressive prospectus for ICIC’s October 2003 forum 
in NEW YORK CITY, THE STATE OF THE INNER CITY ECONOMIES, at http://www.icic.org/ 
Documents/soice.ppt (last visited Jan. 9, 2004). 
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CED undertakings in sight. It is permissible to hope that these 
projects will provide scores of examples of cooperation between the 
businesses and the CBOs in the fashion I have suggested. 
CONCLUSION 
The stories recounted in this Essay are, at the very least, a 
reminder of the importance of nongovernmental actors in the fields I 
have examined. Direct governmental regulation, including the 
provision of civil remedy, typically depends on the initiative of those 
who suffer discrimination. In the workplace and in public 
accommodations, such laws can be called the civil rights success 
stories of our time. In housing, analogous laws have failed. Where the 
stick fails, however, the carrot may succeed. As the community 
economic development movement suggests, government subsidies 
and other forms of cooperation with private actors offer real 
prospects for renewals of the spirit as well as the neighborhood. One 
way or another, nongovernmental action will continue to play a 
crucial role in determining the fate of the principle of equal 
citizenship at ground level. 
